Many interpreters of Kant in recent decades have assumed that his epistemology and metaphysics, the cornerstones of his Critical philosophy, are proved irrelevant and/or incorrect by one or more postKantian scientific revolutions. 

Kant's aim, so the story goes, was to prove the absolute validity of Aristotelian logic, Euclidean geometry, and Newtonian physics, yet all three of these classical sciences have been surpassed by scientific revolutions that occurred after Kant's death, thus rendering his theoretical philosophy irrelevant to modern science. 

In a forthcoming book, Kant's Critical Science: Precursor to Scientific Revolutions (Routledge 2025), I aim to dispel this common myth by examining some of the most important scientific revolutions that took place in the 150 years after the publication of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1781: far from supplanting the key tenets of Kant's theoretical philosophy, it turns out that in most cases the thinkers who instigated these scientific revolutions were directly influenced by their reading of Kant's philosophy; in each case, the new scientific theory can be regarded as an application of Kant's Copernican revolution in philosophy. 

In my Kant300 lecture, I shall provide an overview of several key examples of this way of tracing Kant's influence on modern science.