In my presentation, I explore the various theoretical facets of transcendental apperception in Kant’s philosophy, focusing on the ‘I think’ as a simple and empty representation of self-consciousness. 

Key elements include the metaphysical linkage of thinking (spontaneity) and being, the epistemic assertion that thinking transcends knowledge, and the semantic use of ‘I think’ in self-representation. 

The analysis situates these ideas within the ongoing debate between ‘one-world’ (two aspect) and ‘two-world’ (two-object) interpretations of Kantian idealism, probing whether appearances and things in themselves represent varying perspectives or distinct ontological entities. 

This inquiry underscores the significance of a unified subjectivity that merges phenomenal and noumenal dimensions, challenging the notion of separate ontological selves through the lens of the concept of a transcendental subject. 

The formal nature of this concept is crucial and is paralleled with that of the 'transcendental object' in the structure of knowledge. 

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