Within secondary literature, the doctrine of the highest good has raised numerous controversies.

Due to its profound ambiguity, several divergent interpretations have appeared in more recent literature.

Among these interpretations, two lines stand out: one current defends that the highest good must be understood from an individual, transcendent and religious perspective, according to which the connection between virtue and happiness is thinkable under the joint conditions of the immortality of the soul and existence of God.

Another line believes that the doctrine of the highest good only becomes coherent when conceived from a collective and immanent perspective, from which a central role is attributed to its historical and political dimension.

For the latter, the writings of the 1790s would mark a change of perspective, in which the transcendent position of the previous decade would have been abandoned in favor of an immanent perspective.

My objective is to present, in general, the status of the issue, as well as some arguments in favor of a compatibilist thesis.

I argue that, from a systematic perspective, the immanent perspective is problematic and therefore the transcendent perspective needs to continue to be considered the basis of the doctrine of the highest good.

Finally, I argue that, as a problem of reason, the highest good must be interpreted, in its immanent and transcendent dimensions, as a new approach to the problem of theodicy.